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NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS-TWO-STEP
PROCUREMENT, COST AND PRICING
DATA REQUIREMENTS AND PROTESTS
TO THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
GILBERT A. CUNEO* AND ELDON H. CROWELL**
I. INTRODUCTION t
Negotiated purchases vary in form from a five dollar purchase by
the contracting officer over the telephone to the letting of a billion
dollar contract which may involve a detailed written solicitation and a
procedure similar to that of formal advertising for bids. All negotiated
purchases have elements in common which distinguish them from
formally advertised contracts. Most important of these is that negotia-
tion permits greater flexibility of action than is possible under the
statutory requirements governing formal advertising. For this reason
negotiation is extremely popular with the Department of Defense.
Five years ago a specialist in the office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Supply and Logistics stated that over eighty per cent
of the dollars (and over ninety per cent of the transactions) involved
in procurement by the Department of DefenAe was spent under nego-
tiated contracts.' The figures today are approximately the same.= Re-
gardless of the fact that some of this bulk fits into categories which
* KB. 1934, St. Vincent; LL.B. 1937, Harvard; Partner in the firm of Cummings
& Sellers, Washington, D.C.; Member, New York and District of Columbia Bars.
** A.B. 1948, Princeton University; LL.B. 1951, University of Virginia; Partner
in the firm of Cummings & Sellers, Washington, D.C.; Member, Connecticut and District
of Columbia Bars.
The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of C. Stanley Dees, an associate
in the firm of Cummings & Sellers and a member of the Virginia Bar.
1 Pi!son, Negotiated Contracts, 18 Fed. B.J. 126, 127 (1958). Mr. Filson diminished
somewhat the dramatic effect of these problems by saying that over 75 per cent of the
transactions involved less than $1,000 and that all or most of all aircraft, guided missiles,
ships and research and development were purchased by negotiation.
2 In fiscal year 1962 out of over 7.5 million transactions entered into by the De-
partment of Defense, 95 per cent were negotiated under one of the 17 exceptions set
forth in 10 U.S.0 §§ 2304(a) (1)-(17) (1958). Contracts involving less than $2,500 (80
per cent) and purchases outside the United States (9 per cent) accounted for most of this
bulk. Turning from number of transactions to dollai. figures, out of 28.1 billion dollars
spent via defense contracts, 87 per cent was spent through the medium of negotiated
contracts. Of this latter figure, purchases where formal advertising is impractical (15 per
cent), contracts involving experimental, developmental or research work (22 per cent)
and purchases of technical supplies requiring substantial initial investment or an extended
period of preparation for manufacture (33 per cent) are the principal avenues of spending
by negotiation. Of the two categories listed above which comprise the bulk of the
transactions by number, each accounts for about four per cent of the money spent by
negotiated contracts as does the category "otherwise authorized by law" of which the
bulk is small business set-asides.
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are not of general interest to the everyday contractor, 3 the fact cannot
be ignored: the government does most of its business by negotiation.
That fact, running, as it does, contrary to the popular conception
that advertising for bids is the principal method of procurement, means
that the problems of procurement by negotiation merit some current
analysis. Accordingly, this article will, after a brief resume of the
statutory background, discuss negotiation generally and then three
important, but not necessarily related, problems within this area: two-
step procurement, cost and pricing data requirements and protests to
the Comptroller General.
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Even before an 1861 statutory enactment,' it has been the strong
desire of Congress that the various executive departments procure
by advertising for bids except where personal services are involved
or immediate delivery is necessary. 5
 This meant that, until the require-
ments of that Act were suspended by the President during World
War II,° the majority of procurement was carried on by the use of
solicited competitive bids and formal award to the lowest bidder. As
a general rule, formal advertising has been preferred because it gives
all interested persons a chance to contract with the government and
usually guarantees a loW price to the government. Allowing adminis-
trative officials, subject to all the weaknesses and pressures of men in
high places, to place contracts where they wish opens a Pandora's
Box.' However, World War II showed that a major power in time of
crisis generally turns to negotiation. A hard and fast rule of adver-
tised procurement is no longer acceptable.
3 Supra note 1.
4
 Rev. Stat. § 3709 (1875). This statute provided:
All purchases and contracts for supplies or services, in any of the Departments
of the Government, except for personal services, shall be made by advertising a
sufficient time previously for proposals respecting the same when the public
exigencies do not require the immediate delivery of the articles or performance
of the service.
As amended, the Act is found in 63 Stat. 400 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1958) and it now
adds these exceptions: "contracts involving less than $500, when there is only one source
of supply or when the services are to he performed by the contractor in person and are
(1) of a technical and professional nature or (2) under government supervision and paid
for on a time basis."
5 Congress limited the military departments to purchases in the open market or
by advertising as early as 1809. 2 Stat. 536 (1809). In an opinion letter to the Secretary
of the Navy, the Attorney General limited this to publicly advertised proposals. 2 Ops.
Att'y Gen. 257 (1829).
6 By Exec. Order No. 9001, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787 (1941), the President emancipated
the War and Navy Departments from these restrictions pursuant to the authority
granted him in Section 201 of the First War Powers Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 839. During
this war virtually all procurement was done by negotiation. See King, Procurement by
Negotiation, 12 Fed. B.J. 256, 257 & n.6 (1952).
7 See United States v. Brookridge Farm, 111 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1940).
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Even before the conclusion of World War II, the Procurement
Policy Board of the War Production Board came forward with the
recommendations which led to the passage of the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947." This statute, enacted in February 1948,
defines the scope of advertising and negotiation° for the Department
of Defense." A little over a year later, Congress enacted the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. 11 This Act' sets
forth in statutory form the procurement procedures for the General
Services Administration and all other executive agencies not covered
by the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. In structure and
language it follows the latter Act. 13
The present statutes now represent a compromise and allow for
both advertising and negotiation. It is interesting to note, however,
that there were, at the very beginning, differences of opinion as to the
proper emphasis of the statutes. The Senate report states that the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 returns the government to
procurement by formal advertising while allowing for negotiation in
certain instances!' The Acting Secretary of the Navy who drafted the
bill said, however, that the purpose was to allow the military during
peacetime to procure by negotiation wherever the need was felt." The
former statement undoubtedly reflects the intent of Congress; the
latter is more in accord with reality.
The Armed Services Procurement Act demands formal advertis-
ing when contracting for the purchase or construction of most prop-
erty!' with the exception that negotiation may be utilized in seventeen
8 62 Stat. 21 (1948). The Act now appears in 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-14 (1958), as
amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304, 2306, 2310, 2311 (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
9 The Act also: declares a policy of treating small business concerns fairly, bans
cost-plus-percentage-of-cost contracts, delegates functions and responsibilities, deals with
advance payments and spells out the role of the Comptroller General.
19 10 U.S.C. § 2303 (1958).
st 63 Stat. 377 (1949) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 40, 41 U.S.C. (1958)).
12 63 Stat. 393 (1949), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-60 (1958).
13 See H.R. Rep. No. 670, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
14 The bill, as amended, provides for a return to normal purchasing procedures,
through the advertising-bid method on the part of the armed services .. . It
capitalizes on the lessons learned during wartime purchasing and provides
authority, in certain specific and limited categories, for the negotiation of con-
tracts without advertising. It restates the Rules governing advertising and
making awards as well as fixing the types of contract that can be made.
S. Rep. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1948),
IC The primary purpose of the bill is to permit the War and Navy Departments
to award contracts by negotiation when the national defense or sound business
judgment dictates the use of negotiation rather than the rigid limitations of
formal advertising bid and award procedures.
Hearings on H.R. 1366 Before the House Committee on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., 425 (1947).
18 See 10 U.S.C. § 2303(b) (1958) where 10 non-exclusive categories are set out. Note
that personal services and technical research and assistance do not seem to be included
in the term "property."
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specified situations." The most important of these exceptions, in the
absence of a declaration of national emergency, are contracts which
fall in the tenth, eleventh and fourteenth exceptions." By far, the
largest number of negotiated contracts prior to December 1956, how-
ever, were negotiated pursuant to the first exception, that is, where
the public interest demands negotiation during a national emergency?'
The Comptroller General, however, seems to claim the right to oversee
the exercise of this authority by the heads of the procuring agencies.'
Though the use of this category has since declined markedly, it is in-
teresting to note that a Bill has been introduced in Congress to declare
an end to the national emergency which has existed since the Korean
War.' Under Title III of the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act, there are listed fifteen similar exceptions to the advertis-
ing requirement.' It should be noted that under both of these acts
the authority to negotiate construction contracts is much narrower than
in the case of those for supplies and services."
17 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a)(1)-(17) (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (a) (14)
(Supp. IV, 1959-62). Briefly, these exception categories are: (I) national emergencies;
(2) public exigency ; (3) purchases not in excess of $2,500; (4) personal or professional
services; (5) services of educational institutions; (6) purchases outside of U.S.; (7)
medicines or medical supplies; (8) supplies purchased for authorized resale; (9)
perishable subsistence supplies; (10) formal advertising impracticable; (11) experimental,
developmental, or research work; (12) classified purchases; (13) technical equipment
requiring standardization; (14) technical supplies requiring substantial initial investment
or extended preparation for manufacture; (15) negotiation after unsuccessful advertising;
(16) needed for industrial mobilization or preparation to meet emergencies; (17)
otherwise authorized by law. For a detailed analysis of the scope of, and the reasons
for, each exception, see ASPR, 32 C.F.R. §§ 3.200-217 (Supp. 1963); S. Rep. No. 571,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-15 (1947) ; H. Rep. No. 109, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-17 (1947);
Cuneo, Government Contracts Handbook 23-27 (1962); I McBride & Wachtel, Govern-
ment Contracts §§ 9.30-.190 (1963).
18 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (a) (10) (11) and (14) (1958). See note 2, supra, for a more
detailed breakdown.
19 For a detailed analysis of the meaning and use of the first exception for national
emergencies (10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1) (1958)) see! McBride & Wachtel, supra note 17, at
H 910[31, 9.30; and King, supra note 6, at 259-64.
20 See 33 Dees. Comp. Gen. 441 (1954); 30 Dees. Comp. Gen. 441 (1951) (reserved
right to determine presence of collusion or other improprieties). Upon finding any im-
proprieties in the use of this exception, the Comptroller General has stated he will report
it to Congress. See 31 Decs. Comp. Gen. 279 (1952). The Department of Defense has
issued regulations limiting the use of this exception to "set-asides" for labor surplus
and small business programs. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.201-2, 28 Fed. Reg. 2093 (1963).
21 HR. 7408, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) states:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the national emergency
proclaimed to exist by Proclamation Numbered 2914, dated December 16,
1950 (15 F.R. 9029; 64 Stat., part 2, A454) is hereby terminated.
22 See 63 Stat. 393 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1958). Exceptions 14 and 16 set forth
in 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (14) (Supp. iv, 1959-62),
and listed briefly in note 17 supra, are not allowed under this Act.
23 10 U.S.C. § 2304(c) (1958); 63 Stat. 393 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 252(e) (1958).
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III NEGOTIATION GENERALLY
As the figures showing the percentage of procurement done by
negotiation illustrate, the exceptions have proven the rule. It behooves
the contractor to know negotiation procedures. However, since, with
respect to their creation, negotiated contracts are not generally sub-
ject to restrictive Comptroller General rulings to the same extent as
are advertised contracts, general statements are more apropos than
extended discussion.
Having passed the first hurdle of statutory authorization, the
next problem is the existence and scope of the power of the head of
an agency to negotiate a contract under each exception. Under the
Armed Services Procurement Act, the head of the agency may delegate
to lower officials his discretionary power to make the decisions and
determinations called for in exception categories one through ten."
In categories eleven through seventeen his right to delegate is limited,
or nonexistent. However, in these categories, as well as in exception
category one, the decision of the head of the agency is final' and
should be binding on the Comptroller Genera1. 2° As an additional
caveat, when the authority has been delegated and yet the contracting
officer must, by regulation, go back up the line and get approval from
superiors, the contractor encounters what is often called a "business
clearance."27
Leaving the realm of authority and turning to the practical side,
the contracting officer must pay for his greater flexibility in the coin
of more preliminary work. Before a contracting officer can negotiate
a contract, he must locate potential suppliers. Solicitation of sources
of supply may be done by telephone, telegraph or any other means of
communication. If considerable information must be given to prospec-
tive suppliers, a request for proposal form may be sent out. This form
is very similar to the invitation for bids. The contracting officer will
solicit proposals or quotations from as many qualified sources of sup-
ply as are needed to assure full and free competition, and thus procure
the best quality for the government at the most favorable price.
It is particularly important for the contractor to note at this
point that there is operative an amendment to the Armed Services
Procurement Act which in many instances requires: (1) that "pro-
posals be solicited from the maximum number of qualified sources
24 10 U.S.C. § 2311 (Supp. IV, 1959-62). The comparable power in the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act is found in 63 Stat. 396 (1949), 41 U.S.C.
§ 257(b) (1958).
25 See 10 U.S.C. § 2310 (Supp. IV, 1959-62); 63 Stat. 396 (1949), 41 U.S.C.
§ 257 (1958).
25 37 Decs. Comp. Gen. 72, 75 (1957); 37 Decs. Comp. Gen. 430, 435 (1957).
27 E.g., ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 1.403(6) (1961).
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which is consistent with the nature and requirements of the supplies
and services to be procured"; and (2) that written or oral discussions
be conducted with all the responsible offerors who are in the competi-
tive range." The first requirement puts into statutory language that
which has always been the intent of Congress. The second point has
a tendency to make negotiation both more competitive and more like
the bargaining table. The amendment does not apply, however,
wherever the contract involves less than $2,500, the prices are fixed
by law or regulation or the time for delivery is too near at hand.
Furthermore, the second requirement applies neither to the "set-aside"
programs nor to the acceptance of an initial proposal which will
result in a fair price because of the existence of active competition or
accurate prior cost experience, if at the outset the offerors are informed
of the possibility of an initial acceptance.
Unlike the formal advertising procedure, in negotiation each pro-
posal may be opened and examined immediately upon its receipt. The
contracting officer records and keeps confidential such information.
He selects those bids which appear to be most advantageous to the
government, price and other factors being considered. He then studies
the proposals, considering the same various factors which are used as
guidelines under the formal advertising procedure to determine ac-
ceptability. If the formal advertising procedure were being followed,
the contracting officer would now have to accept the bid of the lowest
responsible bidder most advantageous to the government considering
allocations, or else reject all bids. The negotiation procedure offers
him considerably greater flexibility. He may select a few of the best
proposals and bargain with those who submitted them. He must nego-
tiate to give the goveniment the best bargain possible.
It is obvious that the negotiation and decision functions may take
some time. The situation is ripe with possibilities for "carrying a con-
tractor along" as an insurance factor even though it is known that his
proposal will not be accepted. One comparatively recent addition to
the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) has been made
to alleviate this situation." It states that wherever, with contracts in-
volving more than $10,000, it is likely that more than thirty days will
be required for evaluation of proposals, the contracting officer will
promptly notify all those who have submitted unacceptable proposals.
He is not required to give this notice, however, where it will prejudice
the government's interest and in certain other specific instances set
forth in the regulation. The notice informs the contractor in general
terms of the reason the proposal was unacceptable. Of course, after
the making of an award, with the same specific limitations, all un-
28 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
22 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.106, 28 Fed. Reg. 4882 (1963).
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successful offerors are to receive notice telling them the number of
contractors solicited, the number of proposals, the names of all award
recipients, the items, quantities and unit prices of each award and the
reason for not accepting the offeror's proposal if the information above
does not reveal it.
Once the proposal is accepted, the next problem is that of using
the proper contract form for the situation. Sections 3-400 to 3-410 of
ASPR deal with types of contracts available and state generally that
the fixed-price contract is preferred. However, where the nature of the
procurement is such that the cost of performance cannot be estimated
with substantial accuracy, the contracting officer may negotiate a con-
tract on other than a firm fixed-price basis. Some of the other bases are
cost, cost-plus-a-fixed-fee, cost-plus-an-incentive-fee, fixed-price with
price redetermination and escalation incentive provisions generally.
Under formal advertising, a fixed-price contract is required."
There is, unfortunately, a cloud on the horizon in regard to the
flexibility of a negotiated contract. In its recent decision in G. L.
Christian & Associates v. United States," the Court of Claims has
enunciated a doctrine that may render non-existent the contracting
officer's (or even the Secretary of Defense's) ability to negotiate a
contract form. In that case the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Properties and Installation drafted, with the concurrence of the Fed-
eral Housing Commission, a complicated Housing Form Contract for
Capehart Housing Act projects." He had the statutory authority to
put in any terms he saw fit" and chose to leave out the "Termination
for the Convenience of the Government" clause. He did this because
Capehart projects are specifically long-range projects and there was
3I)
 Most of the forms used in connection with negotiated contracts of the military
departments are those of the Department of Defense. The request for proposals and the
proposal is DD Form 746. The schedule which describes the supplies or services and
contains information pertaining to delivery is DD Form 746-1. The acceptance of the
proposal is made on DD Form 746-2, which, together with the other two above-mentioned
documents, make up the contract documents. The general provisions set forth in U.S.
Standard Form 32 are attached or incorporated by reference in these documents. In
the case of: (1) most cost-reimbursement contracts; (2) negotiated fixed-price type
supply contracts not exceeding $10,000 which are for standard or commercial items; and
(3) when proposals lead to further negotiations, DD Form 1261 should be used to execute
the contract.
3t 312 F.2d 418, motion for rehearing denied, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl. 1963). Part II of
the first opinion and the entire second opinion on the motion for rehearing are
pertinent. [Ed. note. Mr. Gilbert A. Cuneo, co-author of this article, was counsel of
record for the petitioner on both the motion for rehearing and the petition for writ
of certiorari.]
Capehart Housing Act is the popular name for Title IV of the Housing Amend-
ments of 1955, 69 Stat. 646, as amended by Title V of the Housing Act of 1956, 70 Stat.
1096, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1720(1) (1958), 1748-1748(h) (3) (Supp. IV, 1959-62), and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1594-1594(j) (Supp. IV, 1959-62). For an explanation of this act as well as its rela-
tion to the Miller Act see Note, 49 Va. L. Rev. 174 (1963).
33 69 Stat. 652 (1955), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1594a (1958).
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no need felt for such a clause. Further, the absence of the clause made
the private mortgage financing easier to obtain and the eventual con-
tract price lower.
Unexpectedly, the Secretary of Defense closed down the army
fort where one of the projects had commenced and he cancelled the
contract. The contractor sued for his costs and the anticipated profit,
i.e., common law damages. Had the above mentioned Termination
Clause been in the contract, the contractor would have been entitled
only to a specified limited profit on the work done. Section 8-703 of
ASPR," promulgated as an internal regulation governing contracting
officers and other agency officials, states that the Termination Clause
should be put in all contracts of this type. The Court of Claims held
that the Termination Clause should be incorporated into the contract
"as a matter of law." That the possible future effect of this ruling is
awesome is only slowly becoming obvious. All the regulations promul-
gated by the Secretary of Defense which deal with types of contracts
pose as a trap for the unwary who contract with the government. Re-
gardless of the fact that a duly empowered agency head draws up and
signs a solemn contract of a certain type to fit a certain factual situa-
tion, the contractor may find, unless the Supreme Court reverses the
Christian case, all the rules promulgated by that same agency head
(ASPR is hundreds of pages long!) incorporated into the contract.
IV. TWO-STEP PROCUREMENT
And step by step, since time began,
I see the steady gain of man."
Two-step procurement is properly called two-step formal adver-
tising," but a discussion of the subject in this article is desirable be-
cause this technique partakes of two worlds. Despite the dichotomy
between negotiation and advertising, emphasized earlier, here is an
area where the best of both are incorporated into one procedure. Two-
step procurement was placed into effect by the Department of the Air
Force in 1957 at the suggestion of the Subcommittee for Special In-
vestigation of the House Armed Services Committee.37 It was devised
"to increase the use of advertising procedures in situations where
negotiation would ordinarily be required because technical specifica-
tions are not sufficiently definite to assure that all bidders will offer to
supply items meeting the particular need of the Government." (Italics
in original.)
34 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 8.703 (Supp. 1963).
35 Whittier, The Chapel of the Hermits.
36 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 2.501 (1961).
81 Subcommittee for Special Investigations of House Armed Services Committee,
85th Cong., 1st Sess., Study of Armed Services Procurement Act 652 (1957). (Hereinafter
cited as Subcommittee.)
38 2 Government Contractor g 386 (1960).
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From that statement, it can readily be seen that two-step procure-
ment has tremendous potential." There are complicated and technical
areas where the government knows what it wants in terms of result or
performance and where there are several contractors who are tech-
nically qualified to do the job." Normally, because the procuring
agency has not had prior experience and does not have sufficient
definitive specifications and requirements and/or because the agency's
technical people wish to make engineering evaluations and discuss the
requirements with the bidder, formal advertising would not be used.
Accordingly, the benefits of the competition inherent in that method
are not available to the government.
Now, by conducting the procurement in two phases, the procuring
agency can have its cake and eat it too. The agency simply sends out
a solicitation for technical proposals to all possibly interested and tech-
nically capable firms. This "request for technical proposals" usually
contains a stricture against including prices and a notification of the
intent to conduct the procurement in two steps. Among other things,
it should also give the best practical description of what is desired, an
outline of what form the proposal should take and what details are
desired and the criteria to be used in evaluating the technical pro-
posals." A new addition to the regulations urges contracting officers
to include an invitation for multiple proposals from each source.'
After receiving the proposals," the agency hands them to its
engineering personnel and asks them to decide which ones are tech-
nically acceptable. The regulations specifically urge the agency not
to find a proposal unacceptable if a reasonable effort by the govern-
ment could make the proposal acceptable." This means the proposal
should not be found unacceptable for superficial or hyper-technical
inadequacies when the government actually knows what is intended.
Even more important, the same section also provides for discussions,
additional information and clarification. This has led to the practice
of accepting "marginal" proposals which can be made acceptable by
a minimum and reasonable effort on the part of the offeror. Materially
defective proposals, however, are found to be unacceptable and are
rejected.
as The Department of the Air Force has recently authorized the procedure for
construction contracts. AFPI, 32 C.F.R. §§ 1002.500-1002.503-1 (Supp. 1962).
40 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 2.502(c) (1961). Obviously, this method has no advantage
over negotiation if there is only one qualified contractor who can be expected to bid.
41 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 2.503-1(a) (1961), as amended, 32 C.F.R. § 2.503-1(a)(8)
(Supp. 1963), 28 Fed. Reg. 4882 (1963).
42 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 2.503-1(a) (10), 96 Fed. Reg. 4882 (1963).
4s The government reserves the right to receive and consider late proposals but does
not have to do so and can bold the offerors to a firm due date if time is of any importance.
See Subcommittee, supra note 37, at 660.
44 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 2.503-1(b) (5) (1961).
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This distinction causes some disagreement over the question of
how far the agency must go in permitting and helping the offeror to
achieve an acceptable proposal." The answer by the Comptroller
General is that the procurement officials must be able to reasonably
circumscribe the area of consideration wherever it is necessary to
enter the second step and complete the procurement within their time
limitations." Accordingly, barring an unreasonable determination
which does not have factual support, the procurement official's deter-
mination that a proposal is materially deficient is final. It is obviously
in the best interests of the country, as well as being the intent of the
regulation, that every opportunity be given to the offerors to come
within the scope of the government's needs and desires. Any firm rule
would be inadvisable, however, because such a move would drive the
agency back to using straight negotiation."
Step two consists of inviting each firm submitting an acceptable
technical proposal to submit a bid on its own proposal. Here, price is
mentioned for the first time and data as to credit and responsibility
first become relevant. The regular formal advertising procedures are
followed and the contract must be awarded to the lowest responsible
bidder. A firm fixed-price contract or a fixed-price with escalation
clause contract must be used. Thus the two-step procurement con-
sists of step one, similar to negotiating a contract, and step two, similar
to formal advertising. With it the military departments receive the
benefit of the best of both worlds, retaining the necessary flexibility
of negotiated procurement and also retaining the congressional ap-
proval of competitive bidding.
As the Christian case" has thrown confusion into the realm of
negotiated contract provisions, so a recent decision of the Comptroller
General has thrown confusion into the two-step procurement pro-
cedures.' In answer to a recent protest, the Comptroller General stated
that in a two-step procurement a military department need not follow
its own established procedures." Therefore, a responsible contractor
not only has no firm guide-line to what clauses will be incorporated
into his negotiated contract, but does not even know what policies will
be disregarded in a two-step procurement.
45 This problem was anticipated by the Air Force. See Subcommittee, supra note
37, at 660.
46 40 Decs. Comp. Gen. 40 (1960) ; 40 Decs. Comp. Gen. 35 (1960).
47 An aggrieved contractor may always protest to the Comptroller General the
failure of the contracting officer to consider his proposal acceptable.
48 G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, motion for rehearing
denied, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct.CI. 1963).
49 Ms. Comp. Gen., No. B-151787 (1963) (unpublished).
50 Id. at 6.
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V. COST AND PRICE CERTIFICATION
Truth will work wonders. All this section requires is that the
truth be made known at the time of the bargaining. Who can
object to telling the truth?"
Although little has been written or published on this subject, no
briefing conference, institute, seminar or series of lectures on govern-
ment contracts in the past year has failed to include a section devoted
to the so-called truth in negotiations law.' The law requires that the
contractor must submit, under certain circumstances, cost or pricing
data prior to the award of a negotiated contract, which cost or pricing
data shall be certified to be "accurate, complete and current' as of
a certain date. This certification applies to a contract change or modifi-
cation,' as well as to the original contract, when it is expected that
the price adjustment will exceed $100,000; it also applies to subcon-
tracts of any tier if the price of such subcontract is expected to exceed
$100,000 and the prime was required to furnish such a certificate."
The Act has been implemented by regulations" effective as of Decem-
ber 1, 1962 and incorporated into ASPR."
The regulations provide that a certificate's must be submitted
51 Statement of Representative F. Edward Hebert on H.R. 5532, Hearings Before
the Senate Committee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1962) (hereinafter cited as Hearings).
52 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (Stipp. IV, 1959-62). For discussion see, for example, May
2-3, 1963, George Washington University, Federal Bar Association Tenth Annual Govern-
ment Contracts Institute, Lecture by Louis A. Cox, Vice Chairman, ASPR Com-
mittee, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (I & L); June 11-12, 1963,
Machinery and Allied Products Institute, Seminar on Government Contracts, Dis-
cussion by K. K. Kilgore, Deputy Comptroller for Audit, Department of Defense
and James A. Robbins, Deputy Chief, Army Audit Agency; July 8-19, 1963,
Southwestern Legal Foundation, Short Course on Government Contracts, Lecture
by Gilbert A. Cuneo; August 11, 1963, American Bar Association Annual Meeting,
Administrative Law Section, Public Contracts Division, Remarks by Lawrence E.
Chermak, Counsel, Office of the Comptroller, Department of the Navy; Sept. 12-13,
1963, University of Minnesota, Seminar on Government Contracts, Lecture by Col.
Wm. W. Thybony, Chairman, ASPR Committee, Department of Defense and Maynard
O. Panser, Assistant to Comptroller, Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company.
53 10 U.S.C. § 2306(1) (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
54 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (2) (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
55 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (3) (SuPp. IV, 1959-62).
se ASPR, 32 C.F.R. §§ 3.807-3 (Cost and Pricing Data), 8.807-4 (Certificate),
7.104-29 (Price Reduction for Defective Data), 7.104-41 (Audit), 7.104-42 (Subcontractor
Cost and Pricing Data) (Supp. 1963), as amended by 28 Fed. Reg. 2095, 2098, 4884, 4886,
6068 (1963).
57 The new regulations require the certificate, when applicable, for all contracts
entered into after December 1, 1962.
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807 -4, 96 Fed. Reg. 2095 (1963). This is to certify that, to
the best of my knowledge and belief:
(i) complete pricing data or cost data current as of 	
 have
(Date)
[Describe the proposal, quotation, request for
price adjustment, or other submission involved giving appropriate identifying
53
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prior to the award of any redeterminable, cost reimbursement or in-
centive contract, regardless of the dollar amount, or prior to the award
of any firm fixed-price or fixed-price with escalation negotiated contract
expected to exceed $100,000 in amount. The certificate must also be
submitted in the case of contract modifications which are expected to
exceed $100,000 independent of whether or not cost or pricing data
was required under the initial contract and regardless of whether the
contracts were formally advertised or negotiated. In addition, the
contracting officer may require the obtaining of a certificate in con-
tracts or modifications of less than $100,000 if he so believes circum-
stances warrant.
Quite naturally, the importance of the certificate is the proviso
in the truth in negotiations law" that the contract price shall be
adjusted to exclude sums based upon inaccurate, incomplete or non-
current data. The truth in negotiations law is really an outgrowth of
an earlier Congressional bill" which omitted a price certificate re-
quirement upon assurances that such a requirement in regulation form
was sufficient for the purposes envisioned by Congress.' Previously,
the ASPR had provided for a certificate in those cases which met the
requirements of section 3-807.10. 02 However, there never was issued
a section of the regulations denoted 3-807.10 up to and including the
time the Bill was introduced on March 31, 1961." According to the
General Accounting Office, the departments as of 1962 had not made
as much use of the certificates as the Congress felt they should. Repre-
sentative Carl Vinson stated:
Now listen to these figures: Of 364 prime contracts entered
into since the regulations were adopted, 121 of them having
a total value of $253 million had no certified-cost-data as the
regulations require."
	  
and submitted to the Contracting Officer or his representative;
number.]
(ii) all significant changes in the above data which have occurred since the
aforementioned date through 	  have been similarly submitted;
(Date)
and no more recent significant change in such data was known to the undersigned
at the time of executing this certificate; and
(iii) all of the data submitted are accurat e.
NAME 	
TITLE 	
FIRM 	
(Date of Execution)
59 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
co H.R. 12572, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
61 S. Rep. No. 1960, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
62 32 C.F.R. §§ 3.807-3, 3.807-7, 7.104-29 (1961), now amended by 28 Fed. Reg.
4884-86 (1963).
99 Hearings, supra note 51, at 55.
64 Hearings, supra note 51, at 18.
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The failure of the Department of Defense to include the cost certificate
in more contracts caused Representative F. Edward Hebert to be less
charitable than Representative Vinson. Representative Hebert be-
lieved that this failure was a deliberate policy of evasion by the De-
partment of Defense. He stated:
The many-tentacled squid and the multifaced Pentagon
have the same defensive mechanism—each expels quantities
of black ink to throw off its pursuer.
That seems to be just what we have had all along on this
bill."
Adding fuel to the fire was the Boeing renegotiation case,°° de-
cided prior to the Senate hearings on this bill. The court stated:
"Eighty-eight and eight-tenths per cent of the profit here under con-
sideration was derived from performance of what are here termed
incentive contracts. Such contracts are based upon estimated cost of
production."" Both Representatives Vinson and Hebert referred in
several instances to the Boeing case as showing the obvious need for a
statutory requirement for the certificate and not merely an administra-
tive regulation which made the insertion of the certificate only at the
discretion of the Department of Defense." In any event, the Act was
passed by both Houses of Congress and became law on September 10,
1962.
It is astonishing, in view of the tremendous interest of the business
community in this law, that not one single individual company or trade
association appeared before either committee of Congress to vigorously
oppose the enactment of this legislation." The Senate report accom-
panying the Bill stated in succinct language the reasons for the certifi-
cate requirement of current, accurate and complete cost data. It said:
In determining the price under many types of negotiated con-
tracts the Government must rely, at least in part, on cost
and pricing data submitted by the contractor or his subcon-
tractor. In recent years the General Accounting Office sub-
mitted several reports to the Congress on cases in which con-
tractors received unwarranted profits because the data used
65 Hearings, supra note 51, at 56; the Department of Defense specifically opposed
this section of the proposed bill (Hearings, supra note 51, at 9), as did National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (Hearings, supra note 51, at 15).
66 Boeing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 37 T.C. 613 (1962). The Boeing Airplane Com-
pany took an appeal from a Renegotiation Board assessment of excessive profits of $10
million for 1952. Upon appeal by Boeing the Tax Court raised the assessment to $13
million.
67 Id. at 647.
68 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 51, at 16, 17, 57.
69 Representatives of the Electronics Industries Association appeared at the hearing,
but did not vigorously oppose the legislation in oral testimony (Hearings, supra note
51 at 92 et seq.), and in fact made suggestions for only minor changes.
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in establishing target costs or prices were inaccurate, incom-
plete or out of date."
The report added: "The objective of these provisions is to require
truth in negotiating.""
There are four principal exemptions from the provisions of the
regulations. They are: (1) Formally advertised contracts; (2) Nego-
tiated fixed-price contracts under $100,000; (3) Negotiated fixed-
price contracts over $100,000 when the price is based upon "adequate
price competition"; (4) Negotiated fixed-price contracts over $100,000
when the price is based upon "established catalog or market prices of
commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general pub-
lic.' There are also two minor exemptions which will probably not
be available generally to contractors. They are those instances in which
the prices are set by law or regulation (such as public utilities) and
"exceptional cases where the head of the agency determines that the
requirements . . . may be waived . . .
The first two exemptions are self-explanatory. Obviously, Con-
gress did not feel it was necessary for the government to obtain ac-
curate, complete and current cost data for formally advertised con-
tracts. In the second exemption, Congress felt that it would have been
administratively too burdensome for the government to obtain such
information in connection with negotiated fixed-price contracts under
$100,000 when the price is based upon adequate competition. In the
third exemption, "adequate price competition" has not been defined,
but it certainly could be argued that adequate competition could be
obtained simply by a second source of supply for the particular item
in question."
The fourth exemption is concerned with those negotiated fixed-
price contracts where the price is based upon established catalog or
market prices. The Comptroller General has recently indicated that
the department should not accept the price of a catalog item if the
latter happens also to be a proprietary item. In its report to Congress
dated May 20, 1963, entitled "Report to The Congress of the United
States; Examination of Catalog Prices Charged for Airborne Radar
Beacons Developed With Government Funds and Supplied to the
Military Departments and Their Prime Contractors Under Non-
competitive Procurements With ACF Electronics Division, ALF In-
7° S. Rep. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962).
74 Id. at 4.
'm 10 U.S.C. 2306(1) (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
73 Ibid.
74 See Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484 (V.D. Ark.
1949); Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Dawson County, 93 Mont. 310, 19 P.2d 892 (1933) ; cf.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D. N.Y. 1950); 15 Ops. Att'y
Gen. 226 (1872).
56
NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS
dustries Incorporated, Paramus, New Jersey,' the General Account-
ing Office severely criticizes the military negotiators for failing to
demand and receive from ACF cost and pricing data. The Comptroller
General specifically stated:
ACF's use of commercial catalog pricing, however, provided
no assurance that its prices were fair and reasonable and was
inappropriate for unique military hardware sold exclusively
to the Government in noncompetitive procurements.'"
He went on to point out that under the new law, a catalog product
procured without competition is exempt from the requirement to
furnish adequate cost data only if the product is sold in substantial
quantities to the general public." It is clear that the General Account-
ing Office will adopt a strict interpretation of the existing law and
will demand that catalog pricing be a result of a substantial com-
mercial volume of sale. The Comptroller General is placing much
emphasis upon the new Act. In another recently issued report entitled
"Non-competitive Procurement of Military Aircraft Forgings From
Aluminum Company of America at Prices Substantially Higher Than
Current and Expected Costs of Production," dated July 31, 1963, the
Comptroller General states:
Due to the lack of genuine effective competition when pro-
curements of this nature are made from single source sup-
pliers, sufficient information is required from the contractor to
evaluate the company's price proposals to assure that the
Government's interest is adequately protected in price negotia-
tions. Since the chief subject of such negotiations is the costs
that the contractor may incur in the performance of the
work under the contract, adequate, accurate, and timely cost
information [similar to the language of the statute] is es-
sential. It is particularly important that the Government
secure the latest cost data since production costs tend to
decline as a contractor and his suppliers gain additional
production experience on a particular item manufactured."
This is not just a slap on the wrist from the General Accounting
Office, since once the certificate is signed criminal penalties may ensue.
The certificate on its face calls attention to a statutory provision?' pre-
scribing criminal penalties for knowingly making false representations
to the government. The question before the military agencies at this
75 Ms. Comp. Gen., No. B-146781 (1963) (unpublished).
70 Id. at 2 (covering letter to report).
77 Ibid.
75 Ms. Comp. Gen., No. B-146784, 4 (1963) (unpublished).
79 18 U.S.C. 	 1001 (1958).
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time is whether an honest mistake in judgment or an incorrect esti-
mate would subject the contractor to this criminal provision. It is
submitted that the better view would be that the contractor would not
be subject to a price reduction if he did not "knowingly and willfully"
make incorrect statements to the government." This view is supported
by the statement of the Senate report that the object of the law is to
require truth in negotiations. If the contractor does make statements
which are, to his own best knowledge and belief, true, then he should
not be criminally liable. Should the statements later prove to be false,
in some instances the contractor may reap a so-called windfall profit.
However, it is difficult to see a scheme by which such a windfall could
logically be voided under the present law; this is the purpose of the
Renegotiation Act.'
As further evidence of this interpretation,' Representative Hebert
introduced a Bill on August 1, 1963, which clarifies the language and
intent of the previous Bill by declaring that the price shall be adjusted
when it is determined that the cost or pricing data which the contractor
or subcontractor "knew, as of a date agreed upon between the parties
(which date shall be as close to the date of the agreement of the nego-
tiated price as is practicable), was inaccurate, incomplete, or non-
concurrent .. . .""
Another problem, in addition to the problem of the windfall profit,
is the problem of the degree of increase which is sufficient for a con-
tracting officer to reduce the price. The Act states that the price shall
be adjusted to exclude "any significant sums" by which the price was
increased because of the defective data. It is reasonable to assume that
a significant increase should be at least ten per cent. Unfortunately, the
regulations are of no help in determining the extent of the variation
required for a price reduction." It must be assumed that both the
General Accounting Office and the agency involved will be reasonable
in their interpretation and that a reasonable interpretation would
allow a ten per cent increase in the data furnished before action would
be taken by the department or agency involved.
The Act and the regulations seem to be a one-way street, that
80 18 	 § 1001 (1958) provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by
any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing
or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
81 Renegotiation Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 7, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1211-1233 (1958).
82 For a contrary opinion, see 5 Government Contractor If 214 (1963).
83 H.R. 7909, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
84 See ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7.104-29, 28 Fed. Reg. 4886 (1963).
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is to say, the price is not increased if the data furnished prove to be
significantly underestimated. Also open to question is whether or not
there will be any attempt at balancing overestimates and underesti-
mates in the same contract. At the hearings before the Senate Armed
Services Committee it was emphasized that the Act would also serve
to curb some contractors' predilection to underbidding on the hopes
that recovery could be made through the means of various changes.'
Still another problem area is the question of a subcontractor fur-
nishing cost information to his prime." In many instances, the sub-
contractor may be in direct competition with the prime contractor and
will, therefore, not desire to give cost information in connection with
the making up of his bid to the prime contractor. It is submitted that
the most logical method of handling this problem would be for the
subcontractor to give such information directly to the government."
It obviously would be too much to ask of a major subcontractor to
give all of his cost data to his most fierce competitor who happened
to be the prime contractor. Another way of obtaining the desired
result sought would be for the subcontractor to deal directly with the
government.
Many contractors feel that the actual thrust of the Act and the
regulations is to reduce profit. This, of course, is not the announced
purpose of the Act, nor of the regulations issued pursuant to it. This
is also not the purpose as announced by authorities at the Department
of Defense 8P However, as was pointed out by Representative Hebert:
"A proper application of section (g) [the data section] will almost cer-
tainly reduce the work of the Renegotiation Board. It will catch the
padded profit before it is paid, and not years later."" This Act may
not be intended to be an anti-profit statute; it might reasonably result
in an anti-too-much profit statute. The problem areas are many; the
answers are few. Representative Hebert stated that "truth will work
wonders"; but will it also solve tough problems?
VI. PROTEST TO THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
I'll be judge, I'll be jury, said cunning old Fury; I'll try the
whole cause, and condemn you to death."
An important avenue of relief in recent years for the aggrieved
contractor is the protest to the Comptroller General of the United
85 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 51, at 50.
86 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. 7.104-42, 28 Fed. Reg. 6068 (1963).
87 For a discussion of the various remedies presently available see Penne, Legal
Remedies of the Government Subcontractor, 32 So, Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1958).
88 Chermak, supra note 52.
85 Hearings, supra note 51, at 57.
55 Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
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States?' The contractor may feel that he was badly abused because
his proposal, even though it most nearly met the requirements of the
government, was not the proposal the government stated it intended
to accept. He may feel he was badly abused in not being invited to
submit a proposal in the first step of a two-step procurement or a bid
in the second step, or he may feel he is about to be mistreated because
of some threatened action by the government which will do violence
to the established procurement regulations. In such situations, the
avenue for the most prompt action is the Comptroller General and his
General Accounting Office.
The use of the General Accounting Office in these areas has sub-
stantially increased in recent years,°2 in spite of the fact that the con-
tractor has several important hurdles to surmount and that there are
areas of legal confusion in dealing with the General Accounting Office.
If the Court of Claims can be termed "keeper of the nation's con-
science,"" then certainly the Comptroller General can be termed
"keeper of the nation's purse strings." He has stated: "It is our duty
to resolve the doubt in favor of that course which will result in the
conservation of appropriated funds . .
In bid protests and allied cases, the Assistant General Counsel of
the General Accounting Office has stated:
In these cases G.A.O. acts as a sort of referee to see to it that
bidders are treated fairly and the Government receives the
benefits contemplated by the applicable procurement statutes
which require, either expressly or impliedly, that award be
made to that responsible bidder whose bid conforms to the
invitation, specifications and will be most advantageous to the
Government."
The protest made by the contractor need not be made just be-
cause of a threatened award of a negotiated or advertised contract to
another contractor. A protest may also be made in the event the
agency or department involved is threatening to use the contractor's
proprietary data in a competitive negotiated procurement." In that
91 See, Whelan, A Government Contractor's Remedies: Claims and Counterclaims,
42 Va. L. Rev. 301 (1956) ; Birnbaum, Government Contracts: The Role of the
Comptroller General, 42 A.B.A.J. 433 (1956).
92 See Welch, The General Accounting Office in Government Procurement, 14 Fed.
B.J. 321, 327 (1956). For an interesting and informative discussion of the past perform-
ance audit responsibilities of the General Accounting Office with regard to negotiated
contracts see, Powers, Contract Audit and Internal Audit Responsibilities of the
Procurement Agency and of the General Accounting Office, 18 Fed. 13.J. 269, 275 (1958).
93 Ellison, The United States Court of Claims: Keeper of the Nation's Conscience
for One Hundred Years, The Centennial Banquet, 132 Ct. Cl. 1(1955).
tvt Ms. Comp. Gen., No. B-147131 (1960) (unpublished).
95 Welch, supra note 92, at 327.
96 Ms. Comp. Gen., No. B-150369 (1963) (unpublished).
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event, the General Accounting Office will direct the agency or depart-
ment involved to withdraw the material from the bid documents which
contain the proprietary data. A protest may also be lodged because
the contractor believes some other aspect of the negotiation procedures
has been violated to his detriment.
The Assistant General Counsel of the General Accounting Office
has stated that one of the purposes of the review of bid protest cases
by the agency is to assure fair treatment of the contractor. The other
side of the coin is assuring that the government receives the benefits
contemplated by the applicable procurement procedures. In what ap-
pears to be an aberration from this announced policy of fair treatment
of bidders, the Comptroller General has recently held that the depart-
ments need not solicit bids in strict accordance with its own procedures.
He has stated:
[A] failure to solicit bids in strict accordance with procedures
which are prescribed for the purpose of implementing a de-
partmental policy will not invalidate the solicitation or pre-
clude the award of a valid and binding contract based upon
bids received."
This statement does not comport with the traditional attitude of
the Comptroller General in insisting that announced procedures be
followed; nor does it comport with the Supreme Court's insistence that
a department follow its own announced procedures." The Court of
Claims, however, has recently in effect stated in the Christian case"
that implementing regulations may be incorporated in contracts even
against the specific intention of the department or agency involved.'"
No special form is prescribed for use in filing claims with the
Comptroller General. 10 ' However, in practice, a telegram is frequently
sent with a copy to the contracting officer to forestall any threatened
action until a decision has been reached by the Comptroller General.
Then the formal claim letter and brief may be submitted. Although
there is no formal rule to this effect, it is always preferable to have the
protest lodged with the Comptroller General prior to the time the
contract award has been made. The facts upon which the claim is
based should be set forth as fully as possible and a brief in support
of the claim is usually advisable.
- 97 Ms. Comp. Gen., No. B-151787 (1963) (unpublished) .
98 Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1956).
99 G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, motion for rehearing
denied, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
100 In its decision just cited, supra note 97, the Comptroller General fails even to
mention the G. L. Christian & Associates case. Because of the notoriety of the case this
omission must be deliberate.
lot Cuneo, Government Contracts Handbook 213 (1962).
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The contractor may also request a conference, but there is no
formal or informal hearing. The Comptroller General's representa-
tives usually allow a full discussion of all facets of the claim, but
impressions gained from such a conference are not necessarily a guide
as to what the ultimate decision will be. As a practical matter, it is
important to note that the Comptroller General's representatives will
usually allow the contractor or his representative to examine the reply
of the agency or department to the protest. It should be borne in mind
and emphasized that the Comptroller General will accept as true the
facts as given to him by the department or agency involved unless he
is presented with very clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 102
Claims against the government which are to be considered under
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921" must be received in the
General Accounting Office within ten years after the date when the
claims first accrued." There is no statute setting a limit on the time
within which a contractor or claimant may seek to have the General
Accounting Office review its prior decision. In the Raylaine Worsted
case,' the General Accounting Office in 1957 reversed in favor of the
contractor a decision it had rendered in 1942. However, contractors
should be cautioned not to rely upon that case as a general precedent
since the facts therein were most unusual.
Perhaps the best summary made of the function of the General
Accounting Office in this area of protest was made by its Assistant
General Counsel when he stated:
The corrective action which has been and can be taken by
G.A.O. in this class of cases is an important factor in the
preservation and maintenance of the competitive-bidding sys-
tem, which the Office believes to be essential to good Gov-
ernment procurement."
Therefore, it is important for the contractor to remember that if he
is aggrieved, he may protest immediately to the Comptroller General,
who will then determine whether a correction of the grievance will be
a factor in the preservation and maintenance of the competitive bid-
ding system. In this sense of the word, this also includes the preserva-
tion and maintenance of proper procedures in negotiated contracts.
The most important caveat in matters dealing with the General Ac-
counting Office is one of timing; it is essential that notification to the
Comptroller General be made prior to the award of a contract.
102 38 Decs. Comp. Gen. 413, 416 (1958).
103 42 Stat. 24 (1921), 31 U.S.C. 4 71 (1958).
104 54 Stat. 1061 (1940), 31 U.S.C. § 71a (1958).
105 Ms. Comp. Gen., No. B-130131 (1957) (unpublished).
106 Welch, supra note 92, at 329.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In spite of all Congressional protestations, the military depart-
ments, which enjoy the great preponderance in dollar amount of
federal procurement, continue to use more and more negotiated con-
tracts. In an increasingly complex, technical and sophisticated world,
this trend will undoubtedly continue. The two-step procurement pro-
gram and the cost or price certification program are outgrowths of
this increased use of negotiated procurement. Apparently Congress
feels that if it cannot force more formal advertising on the military
departments, the least it can do is to attempt to perfect, control and
modify negotiated procurement. Two-step procurement is one step
in that direction. It provides for negotiation in its' preliminary and
first step procedure, followed by a competitive price system in the
second step. The cost or price certification law and the regulations
pursuant thereto are an attempt to control negotiated procurement and
also to get "truth in negotiation." It is an effort by Congress to require
the military departments to be more careful in their procurement
policy.
Finally, the Comptroller General is becoming more active in the
areas of negotiated procurement, both in his role as guardian of the
purse strings before money is spent and as investigator of costs already
incurred in contracts. He is also active in his role as guardian of
proprietary data and other areas to assure that the contractor is treated
fairly and that the government obtains that to which it is rightfully
entitled.
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